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NOTES
EMPLOYMENT TESTING AND PROOF OF JOB-RELATEDNESS:
A TALE OF UNREASONABLE CONSTRAINTS
I. Introduction
The use of aptitude tests in employment situations is the subject of much
controversy in the area of fair employment law. The controversy extends to
experts in their efforts to develop valid aptitude tests, to the courts in the inter-
pretation and application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and to
conflicts between judicial and psychological points of view over the use of and
methods of verifying aptitude tests in employment situations. Only thrbugh the
effective resolution of these conflicts can the ultimate purpose of employment
testing be achieved.
The purpose of employment testing is to provide a decision maker with a
tool that will better enable him to form an opinion and make a decision about
an employee based on merit. This purpose is recognized and upheld under Title
VII. 2 Numerous judicial opinions, however, have tended to use aptitude testing
systems as a means of implementing affirmative action plans for disadvantaged
groups.3 Clearly, where such-groups have been improperly discriminated against,
remedial actions may be necessary to correct past inequities. This, however,
does not mean that any device or measuring tool that highlights the educational
or aptitudinal differences, although caused in part by past or present dis-
criminatory policies, should be declared invalid. To do so, as many courts have,
might be described as the modem version of killing the messenger who brings the
bad news.'
It is important to realize that aptitude testing is a scientific discipline within
the broader field of applied psychology. As such, cases involving aptitude
testing are very similar to those involving technical medical, engineering or
economic issues. In these areas the questions presented to the court are primarily
factual questions, related to the respective disciplines, and are resolved as such
without a validation of scientific theories through judicial decree. Courts must
be cognizant of the need to extend this type of treatment to other cases which
involve primarily factual issues. Thus, in employment testing cases, the courts
must be particularly sensitive to the necessity of avoiding the temptation to treat
what are actually factual determinations as legal precedents. Failure to do so
results in the adoption of factually limited standards as controlling legal
precedents. This concern is highlighted since the area of aptitude testing does
not represent an exact science, but a changing and expanding one based on
scientific experiment and empirical analysis.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. I, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1970).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
3 Hunt, Civil Service Testing and Affirmative Action: A Psychologist's Perspective, 44
U. CN. L. Rav. 690, 697 (1975).
4 Id.
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Employment testing is a rapidly expanding field that is currently experienc-
ing inevitable growing pains. Consequently, uncertainty in what the law requires
is not infrequent. However, in an effort to clarify at least one aspect of this vast
field, job-relatedness, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
and the courts are attempting to establish rigid policy. In so doing the tendency
of the decisions is to restrict the use of employment tests by imposing unreason-
able requirements which stifle the progression of this field. The focus of the
following discussion will be directed not only toward the powers granted to the
EEOC and the courts pursuant to Title VII, to enable them to play a role in the
effort to end discrimination in employment testing, but also toward the methods
of proving job-relatedness, which is the major manifestation of these powers.
II. Title VII: The Statutory Basis
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forms the basis of minority dis-
crimination claims relating to employment testing. Title VII expressly provides
that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to
hire, discharge, limit, or classify employees or applicants in any way that would
adversely affect their status because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.5
Special recognition, however, is made for the use of professionally developed
ability tests. Under the Act, it is stated that it shall not be an unlawful employ-
ment practice to "act upon the results of any professionally developed ability
test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not
designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."6 While Title VII does form the basis of testing claims, it only
attempts to set out in a broad manner the substantive requirements, not the
procedural ones. These latter rules have been developed over the years by the
courts.
The procedures governing discrimination testing claims have been reviewed
most recently by the Supreme Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody.' The
initial burden of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
rests with the complaining party or class.8 Such a burden will be carried when
it has been shown that the test in question has selected applicants for hire or
promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of
applicants.' Once the prima facie case has been made out the employer will be
required to show that his test has a "manifest relationship to the employment in
question."'" Courts have generally referred to this requirement as the burden of
showing job-relatedness. This burden can be demonstrated through the use
of empirical data verifying that an employment test accurately measures some
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
7 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
8 As an example in McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 "(1973), it was
only necessary to show that (1) the employee was black, (2) the employee applied for a
vacant job for which he was qualified, (3) the employee was rejected, and (4) the employer
continued to seek applicants.
9 422 U.S. at 425 (1975).
10 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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skill, knowledge, aptitude or characteristic which is relevant to the performance
of the job in question.
However, proof of job-relatedness may only dispose of a portion of the
employer's total burden of proof. If the complainant presents evidence showing
that alternate tests or devices would also serve the employer's legitimate interest,
and would do so without the discriminatory effect being challenged, the court
may conclude that the employer's use of the test was merely a pretext for dis-
crimination." Thus, the employer would be required to introduce further
evidence to rebut such a conclusion. However, in the absence of case law deal-
ing with attempts to prove the availability of alternate testing procedures, the
actual extent of this secondary burden remains an open question.
While it is relatively clear what burdens of proof must be carried, and which
party must carry them, the methods for successfully satisfying some of them,
particularly job-relatedness, remain substantially unclear. It is especially im-
portant for the employer that approved methods of proving job-relatedness be
reasonable since most complainants can easily satisfy the burden of establishing
a prima fade case, and consequently, switch the burden of proof to the employer.
As a result, decisions in employment testing cases turn on the employer's ability
to prove job-relatedness. Such a result is due to the interpretation given Title
VII, lessening the requirements imposed on a complainant for the establishment
of a prima fade case.
As noted, the initial burden of showing that an employment test discrim-
inates against a protected group rests with the complainant. In order to establish
a prima fade case it is only necessary to show that discrimination did in fact
occur; one need not show that the testing procedure was used with an intent
to discriminate. The focus on the consequences rather than the motivation of a
specific practice has been found to be the thrust of Title VIIY As a result, the
burden of establishing a claim of improper discrimination through employment
testing is significantly lessened. The burden can thus be met with a relatively
simple showing that a disproportionate number of minority group persons have
performed poorly on the employment test when comparison is made to the
results achieved by the population as a whole.
It should be noted that while the showing of a discriminatory result is
sufficient to establish a claim based on Title VII, the Supreme Court has declined
to permit a constitutional claim of invidious racial discrimination unless the
discriminatory result is accompanied by proof of discriminatory intent. In
Washington v. Davis,"3 the Supreme Court denied a constitutional cause of action
based solely on claims of discriminatory impact and lack of job-relatedness
against the questioned employment test. Although it rejected the constitutional
claim that the employment test violated respondents' rights under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court did not say that a dis-
proportionate impact alone could never form the basis of such a claim. The
Court stated that where the relevant facts, in their totality, infer an invidious
11 422 U.S. at 425; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
12 401 U.S. at 432.
13 44 U.S.L.W. 4789, 4790 (U.S. June 7, 1976).
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discriminatory purpose that cannot be explained on nonracial grounds, a claim
based on a violation of constitutional rights may be justified. 4 While, as the
concurring opinion points out, the line between discriminatory purpose and
discriminatory impact may not be clear or very critical in every situation, 5 this
decision indicates an intent to restrict the testing of claims to Title VII standards.
Thus, an employer or test user is required to meet the burden of proof show-
ing job-relatedness when a complainant sets forth a prima facie case that the
employment test used violates standards under Title VII. In this critical stage
of the litigation the employer must show that the test he is using a job-related.
In attempting to show that an employment test is valid because it is job-related,
the employer must follow the rules established in the Guidelines issued by the
EEOC and subsequent court decisions which have applied those rules.
III. Proving Job-Relatedness
A. EEOC Guidelines: Their Basis and Judicial Acceptance
The judicially adopted procedures for showing job-relatedness have been
greatly influenced by the actions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, a creation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under powers
granted to it, the EEOC has promulgated Guidelines 6 to be used in the valida-
tion of aptitude tests in employment situations. Although the EEOC has been
granted the power to promulgate procedural rules, it does not have authority to
establish substantive rules." The Guidelines were developed and issued without
a hearing, or public participation, 8 as would be required by the substantive rule-
making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.' Thus, the Guidelines
themselves represent only the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII requirements,
and as such are interpretive rules which, while entitled to appropriate respect,
are not binding on the courts.
Considering their nature, the EEOC Guidelines should be more ap-
propriately viewed as opinions of an advocate, subject to debate and review,
than as the more persuasively viewed rules of a regulatory agency. The Supreme
Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody noted that where studies are closely
controlled by a party that has an interest in the litigation, these studies must be
examined with great care.2" Although Albermarle did not directly involve the
EEOC, courts should be mindful of this general principle when considering cases
involving conflicts between an employer's testing procedures and EEOC
Guidelines. Understandably, then, there has been much criticism concerning
the great deference courts have given to the Guidelines.
14 Id. at 4792.
15 Id. at 4800.
16 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970).
18 Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of
Employment Discrimination, 71 MicH. L. Rav. 59 (1972).
19 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
20 422 U.S. at 433 n.32.
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In the landmark decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court
found that the
administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled
to great deference.... Since the Act and its legislative history support the
Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat the Guidelines
as expressing the will of Congress.
21
This notion of great deference has been followed by the lower courts and was
again enunciated in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody by the Supreme Court.22
However, unlike many of the lower courts that have routinely accepted the
Guidelines as controlling, the Albermarle Court did caution that "EEOC Guide-
lines are not administrative 'regulations' promulgated pursuant to formal pro-
cedures established by the Congress."23 Thus the Court indicated that there is
a limit to the persuasive authority of the Guidelines. In any event, attempts to
accord the Guidelines "great deference" are confusing and unpredictable since
the standards established in the Guidelines are oftentimes applied in varying
degrees. It may be more appropriate to say that an interpretation by the EEOC
should always be open to rebuttal and that the weight of the EEOC's inter-
pretation
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade. 24
Although this limited interpretive aspect of the Guidelines has been judicially
recognized, it has not been generally followed by the courts.
B. EEOC Guidelines: Judicial Application of Specific Provisions
Operating under the Guidelines issued by the EEOC, numerous courts have
taken these interpretive rules, which are often theoretical propositions, and stated
them as if they were law.2" This approach has been taken without an attempt to
ensure that the interpretive rules hold true for the factual setting of a particular
case. The result of this is that what are actually factual determinations become
transformed into legal precedents. Among these scientifically controversial con-
cepts are included the preference for criterion-related validity in proving job-
relatedness and the requirement that testing undergo differential validity analysis.
1. Single Method Preference
The preference for a single method of proving job-relatedness developed
21 401 U.S. at 434.
22 422 U.S. at 431.
23 Id.
24 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
25 Brief for American Society for Personnel Administration as Amicus Curiae at 7, Wash-
ington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976) [hereinafter cited as ASPA Amicus
Brief].
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after the American Psychological Association cited three methods of test valida-
tion in its Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals
(1966). These methods include what has commonly been referred to as con-
struct, content and criterion-related validity. Content validity is the most direct
test of an employee's skills. In actuality, it is a demonstration of job duties
disclosed in the job analysis, or a measure of job knowledge or skills that are
critical and essential for immediate performance on a job. Construct validity is
a more indirect validation method that seeks to measure identifiable character-
istics that are associated with successful performance on the job. Criterion-
related validity is also an indirect measure but one that requires a statistical
demonstration of a relationship between the test and job performance criteria.2"
Of these three methods, the EEOC has established a preference for criterion-
related validation.
In its Guidelines, the EEOC requires that a test's validity be based on
studies employing generally accepted procedures for determining criterion-related
validity." The Guidelines limit the use of construct and content validity methods
to instances where criterion-related validity is not feasible. Notably, the Guide-
lines fail to mention the possible existence of other methods of proof. Thus,
the EEOC's inclusion of only these three methods, when taken with the general
acceptance of the Guidelines, has resulted in severely limited judicial recogni-
tion of various alternative test validation methods.
This limited recognition has become deeply entrenched as a result of a
series of recent cases. In Douglas v. Hampton," the District of Columbia Circuit
was faced with an action challenging the use of the Federal Service Entrance
Examination (FSEE) in the employment and promotion of federal employees.
The federal government was not able to demonstrate that the FSEE had
criterion-related validity, but did maintain that they had shown the FSEE to be
job-related through construct validity. After noting the Supreme Court's29
general approval of the Guidelines, and that a sister circuits' had already recog-
nized the Guidelines as controlling, the District of Columbia Circuit"' found it
unwise to depart from these accepted principles. The court concluded that
construct validity would be acceptable only with a showing that criterion-related
validity was not feasible.
This preference for criterion-related validity became even more firmly
26 For example, content validity can be demonstrated by a typing test used to hire a
typist. Construct validity can be demonstrated by a physical fitness test for a fireman since
this characteristic is an important element for good job performance. Criterion-related
validity is demonstrated by comparing test scores with one or more external variables or
criteria to provide a direct measure of the job behavior which the test is intended to predict
or identify. Such external criteria might consist of work proficiency data, supervisory ratings
or regularity of attendance at work. A criteria-related validity can be predictive or concur-
rent. A predictive validity study consists of testing job applicants and comparing their test
scores with some criteria data of job performance collected at a later date. A concurrent
validity study consists of tests administered to present employees and comparing their test
scores with criteria collected concurrently with the testing.
27 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1975).
28 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29 401 U.S. at 433-34.
30 United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
31 512 F.2d at 986.
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implanted with the Second Circuit decision in Kirkland v. New York State De-
partment of Correctional Services. 2 This case in effect reversed the policy of the
Second Circuit as previously established in Vulcan Society of New York City Fire
Department, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission.3 In Vulcan the Second Circuit
said:
The Fourteenth Amendment no more enacted a particular theory of
psychological testing than it did Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Experience teaches that the preferred method of today may be the rejected
one of tomorrow. What is required is simply that an examination must be
shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs for which it was used.34
The later reversal of this policy was due to what the Second Circuit called a
strong endorsement of the EEOC Guidelines by the Supreme Court in Alber-
marie Paper Co. v. Moody. With such an endorsement, the court fully accepted
the Guidelines that provided that evidence of content or construct validity may
be appropriate only where criterion-related validity is not feasible. 5
Of significance is that although the Albermarle Court in its endorsement
did say that the EEOC Guidelines were "entitled to great deference," it prefaced
that conclusion by emphasizing that the Guidelines were administrative interpre-
tations and not regulations. 6 This distinction recognized that the EEOC Guide-
lines had not undergone formal procedures under the Administrative Procedure
Act, and as a result were of more limited persuasion than actual regulations. By
its blanket acceptance of the EEOC provisions, the Second Circuit has given
controlling weight to the Guidelines despite the lack of procedural safeguards
in their promulgation. Such safeguards would have forced the Guidelines to
undergo a stricter scrutiny by interested parties through the administrative hear-
ing process and possibly would have uncovered many of the difficulties that are
currently being experienced with the use of the criterion-related validity method.
Partly as a result of the manner in which the Guidelines were developed, the
requirement that all employment tests be validated by criterion-related methods
had developed without a full understanding as to what such a policy would
later entail. When using the criterion-related method the employer must not
only construct the employment test to examine the skills or characteristics neces-
sary for successful job performance, but he must also develop a separate means of
rating and quantifying successful job performance. The score on the employ-
ment test must then be correlated with the successful job performance rating.
This correlation must be based on valid statistical data the obtaining of which
oftentimes represents an insurmountable burden to the employer.
The use of statistical methods of proof is currently common in all discrimina-
tion suits and is likely to be relied upon to an even greater extent in the future.3
32 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
33 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
34 Id. at 394.
35 520 F.2d at 426.
36 422 U.S. at 431.
37 See generally Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination
Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REv. 387 (1975).
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However, total dependence upon statistical evidence in employment testing
situations can be very misleading. For example, a statistical sample that is too
small for proper mathematical analysis can give results that on their face are
very convincing. In actuality, however, those results may be more accurately
attributed to chance and thus prove nothing.3 8 To date, the decisions reached by
courts in testing cases have frequently lacked the necessary data that would en-
able courts to perform a thorough and accurate statistical analysis. 9 Most large
employers using tests have numerous job positions which, for statistical purposes,
have small populations. Since an employment test should be analyzed separately
for each distinct job, and the small populations involved have inherently large
standard deviations, it is extremely difficult to generate meaningful data. Further-
more, statistical methods become more difficult for employers when they are
trying to quantify subjective type criteria such as successful job performance.
While the test may be scrutinized from an objective standpoint, job per-
formance ratings cannot always be measured with the same objectivity. Decisions
concerning the hiring and promotion of personnel in supervisory and managerial
jobs cannot realistically be made using objective standards alone. Often job
performance must be rated by the use of a supervisor's opinion and not by a
series of written answers as is the case with the correlated employment test. As
the Eighth Circuit recognized in Rogers v. International Paper Co.,4" there are
greater possibilities for abuse in subjective evaluations than in objective evalua-
tions when determining employment selection and promotion criteria. The
difficulty in defining variables such as job performance can do much to defeat the
analysis required in validating a test by criterion-related methods. It has been
noted by psychologists that:
,B]oth the Supreme Court and federal agencies have seized on the logical
simplicities of predictive validity without full recognition that they are
imposing a standard of excellence that does not exist in other areas of
decision making. Little attention has been given to the fact that correlation
coefficients are dependent on both predictor and criterion variables with the
distinct possibility that the latter are more difficult to define operationally
than the former.4
While the federal judiciary has been steadfast in its acceptance and im-
plementation of the specific requirements of the EEOC Guidelines, there has
been an inroad into this area with the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Washington v. Davis.4" The dispute arose when black applicants for positions as
police officers in the District of Columbia were rejected because they failed a
written personnel test (Test 21) measuring verbal skills. The rejected applicants
filed suit alleging that Test 21 bore no relationship to job performance and
excluded a disproportionately high number of black applicants. There was no
38 Schmidt, Berner & Hunter, Racial Differences in Validity of Employment Tests: Reality
or Illusion? 58 J. APPLIED Psyci. 5, 8(1973).
39 ASPA Amnicus Brief, supra note 25, at 5.
40 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir. 1975).
41 Fincher, Personnel Testing and Public Policy, 28 AM. PsYCH. 494 (1973).
42 44 U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976).
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claim of intentional discrimination on the part of District of Columbia officials.
The District of Columbia moved for summary judgment. It contended that
Test 21 did not discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks, and was a useful
and valid indicator of training school performance. As such, the District con-
tinued, the need to show validation in terms of job performance was removed.
Without substantial reference to the EEOC Guidelines, the Supreme Court
in Washington v. Davis affirmed the grant of the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, thus finding that the employees were not entitled to relief on
either constitutional or statutory grounds. 3 Instead of the Guidelines, the
Supreme Court referred to Civil Service Commission instructions on "Examining,
Testing, Standards, and Employment Practices" in finding that Title VII stan-
dards were satisfied.44 This decision is important because it indicates that the
trend of accepting only criterion-related proof is reversing and that alternate
methods, regardless of their exclusion from the EEOC Guidelines, will be ac-
cepted in attempting to show job-relatedness so long as the fact finder is satisfied
that the employer's burden of proof has been met.
In addressing the claim that Test 21"s violated respondents' statutory rights
under Title VII, the Supreme Court found that relating Test 21 to performance
in the police training program instead of actual job performance "seems to us
the much more sensible construction of the job-relatedness requirement." '4 6
Such an appraisal appears to be based on the assumption that the police de-
partment developed the extensive training program to prepare an employee for
the demands that he will actually encounter on the job.
Of added importance is that the holding in Washington v. Davis appears to
give weight to the district court's factual determination that some minimum
verbal and communicative skill, as measured by Test 21, is directly related to
the requirements of the police training program. In reviewing the district court's
decision the Supreme Court found it necessary to determine only whether
sufficient evidence existed for such a conclusion, and did not review the evidence
in a de novo manner as has become the practice of appellate courts in employ-
ment testing cases. Such a review procedure indicates a recognition of the
factual nature of a job-relatedness determination, as opposed to prior decisions
43 Id. at 4790.
44 These instructions establish the following policy:
a. Policy. The Commission's staff develops and uses applicant appraisal procedures
to assess the knowledges, skills, and abilities of persons for jobs and not persons in
the abstract.
(1) Appraisal procedures are designed to reflect real, reasonable, and necessary
qualifications for effective job behavior.
(2) An appraisal procedure must, among other requirements, have a demonstrable
and rational relationship to important job-related performance objectives identified
by management, such as:
(a) Effective job performance;
(b) Capability;
(c) Success in training;
(d) Reduced tumover; or
(e) Job satisfaction. 37 Fed. Reg. 21557 (1972).
45 The Court of Appeals was "willing to assume for purposes of this appeal that ap-
pellees have shown that Test 21 is predictive of further progress in Recruit School." 512
F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
46 44 U.S.L.W. at 4795.
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which indicated that the determination must be made within the framework of
strict legal guidelines.
The Washington v. Davis decision thus reverses the trend among appellate
courts to closely adhere to the EEOC Guidelines and review lower court de-
cisions in a very strict sense. This is evident from the language in Washington
v. Davis which states "[i]t appears beyond doubt by now that there is no single
method for appropriately validating employment tests for their relationship to
job performance."4 Furthermore, with regard to the proper standard of review,
the Supreme Court only looked to see if the "District Court's judgment was
warranted by the record before him."48 Thus, the impact of such a trend could
do much, both in requiring that EEOC Guidelines be followed only where its
conclusions are supported and persuasive, and in insuring that job-relatedness
is judged at the fact-finding level instead of being reviewed de novo at the ap-
pellate level.
The foregoing discussion has traced a portion of the evolution of employ-
ment testing cases. While initial decisions found criterion-related validation to
be virtually the only approved method of validating a test, the Supreme Court, in
Washington v. Davis, criticized the requirement that job-relatedness must be
shown through criterion-related validation. In so doing, it indicated that criteria
other than job performance, specifically, performance in a training program,
can be used in appropriate factual circumstances to validate a test. The Supreme
Court thus appears to be attempting to soften some of the rigid policies that have
previously created enormous barriers to the validation of employment tests.
However, another significant and circumspect policy remains prevalent in em-
ployment testing decisions. This policy requires that employment tests undergo
a differential validity analysis prior to final acceptance.
2. Differential Validity
Along with the preference for a single method of proving job-relatedness,
another judicially approved criterion relating to proof of job-relatedness, which
is of doubtful validity, is the requirement that a differential validity analysis be
conducted.4" While presented as a theory of aptitude testing, in reality differ-
ential validity has tended to be adopted as a convenient means of implementing
affirmative action programs for disadvantaged groups.
The validation methods previously discussed try to establish a correlation
between the employment test and job performance irrespective of a subject's
race. In contrast, differential validity is based on the premise that a member of
a minority race whose job performance equals that of a majority member will
achieve a significantly lower score on a given employment test. When applied,
differential validity would account for past social and environmental depriva-
tions and adjust the employment test score for the minority member. In its
application, differential validity should actually be viewed as an additional re-
47 44 U.S.L.W. at 4794 n.13.
48 Id. at 4796.
49 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)5 (1975).
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quirement to be considered only after initial job-relatedness has been shown.
However, such has not been the case. The requirement that such an analysis
be performed in conjunction with proving job-relatedness, whenever feasible,
was included in the interpretive Guidelines of the EEOC, and was subsequently
adopted by the courts and established as a mandatory rule. 0
The Fifth Circuit initially established the precedent of requiring differential
validation in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co." In finding the
evidence insufficient to establish job-relatedness for the test in question, the court
concluded that:
[A]ny probability of correlation [between the test and job performance]
seems dubious in light of the experience of Roger Stamper, who achieved
a relatively low score on the test but who has admittedly functioned
satisfactorily as a group 1 employee.12
This thin line of evidence prompted the court to commit itself, in United States
v. Georgia Power Co., to what it termed a salient principle of test validation:
"Accepting arguendo that whites scoring high on the test perform satisfactorily
in group 1 positions, to conclude that therefore blacks scoring low could not
adequately perform the same jobs is a non sequitur.""5 Thus, in noting that the
employee was unfairly discriminated against, the Fifth Circuit determined that
the employer would be required, as per EEOC Guidelines, 4 to substantiate its
employment tests based on differential validity analysis. The evidence upon
which this decision was based did not verify the theory of differential validity;
indeed, the evidence presented to the court was scant and, at best, merely in-
dicated that for one particular employee the employment test failed to predict
successful job performance. Furthermore, the court adopted differential valida-
tion despite its own observation that "viewed scientifically, [differential validity]
is the subject of a considerable amount of professional debate.""5 Thus, the
court actually exceeded its expertise in accepting the differential validity theory
and consequently requiring that the absence of such an analysis render a valida-
tion study inadequate.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has not been the only court to weigh the merits
of differential validity. Both of these Fifth Circuit decisions, dealing with an
area in which the expertise of the court should have limited its opinion, were
decided on scant evidentiary records. 6  Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit
followed these decisions in striking down other test validation studies when a
50 422 U.S. 405 (1975), Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975),
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474- F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), United States v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
51 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971).
52 Id. at 456.
53 Id.; 474 F.2d at 914.
54 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)5 (1975).
55 474 F.2d at 914.
56 In United States v. Georgia Power Co., the evidence consisted of testimony that failed
to demonstrate any specific relationship between test scores and job performance for a study
that was initiated shortly after the Attorney General filed the suit. In United States v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., validation was attempted to be shown by comparing employment test
scores with supervisor estimates of job potential instead of actual job performance.
57 510 F.2d at 1350.
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differential validity analysis had not been conducted. In requiring such an
analysis, the court cited only the Fifth Circuit and the EEOC Guidelines for
support.
Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,5"
had an opportunity to rule on the application of differential validity. In a
manner similar to the circuit courts, the Supreme Court also gave "great defer-
ence" to the EEOC Guidelines in adopting the theory.5 9 Again, the only
evidence before the Supreme Court was what it labeled an odd patchwork of
results that attempted to prove job-relatedness; no evidence concerning the ac-
ceptability of differential validity was offered.6" It was shown that the employer
made no attempt to investigate job-relatedness until four months before the
trial. Furthermore, the investigation was headed by a consultant who visited
defendant's plant for only half a day, and was actually conducted by plant
officials without the consultant's supervision. The Supreme Court's ultimate
reliance on the EEOC Guidelines as authority for the validation of differential
validity prompted Chief Justice Burger, as one of two dissenting Justices, to
note:
Its entire analysis is based upon a wooden application of EEOC Guidelines
which, it says, are entitled to "great deference" as an administrative inter-
pretation of Title VII . .. [but] the Guidelines upon which the Court now
relies relate to methods for proving job-relatedness; they interpret no section
of Title VII and are nowhere referred to in its legislative history.6
Despite the criticism in Chief Justice Burger's dissent, courts have tended to
accept differential validity and to apply it to all employment testing situations.
During this period in which the courts have been steadfast in their ac-
ceptance of the differential validity theory, many experts are having doubts that
such a phenomenon does exist.6" The theory had wide appeal a decade ago and
appeared to gain strength in the courts just as the experts were disproving it.
The possible unreliability of differential validity was first acknowledged judicially
by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Georgia Power Co.,6" but it chose instead
to adopt the EEOC Guidelines.64 The Fifth Circuit recognized, but gave little
weight to, an American Psychological Association report that concluded:
This hypothesis, that test scores have different meanings for different sub-
groups, requires extensive research for confirmation or rejection; existing
58 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
59 Id. at 431.
60 Id. at 432.
61 Id. at 451-52.
62 See J. KIRKPATRICK, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1968); Cooper & Sobol,
Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria
of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1663 (1969).
63 474 F.2d at 914.
64 The American Psychological Association in its amicus brief points out that the con-
dusion reached after an extensive six-year study conducted jointly by the Educational Testing
Services, Princeton, New Jersey, and the United States Civil Services Commission, was that
where a differential validity study is not technically feasible, and where the tests have been
chosen on the basis of careful job analysis, a reliable relationship found for whites will usually
hold true for blacks. See J. T. Campbell, AN INvESTIGATION OF SOURCES OF BIAs IN JoB
PREDICTION (Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972).
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evidence is inadequate to determine whether aptitude tests actually dis-
criminate unfairly because of their different validities from one subgroup
to another.6
Indeed, later published studies have shown that some of the mathematical
models that supported older reports upholding the differential validity theory
were statistically invalid.6 Additionally, further tests have resulted in findings
which conclude that "no evidence [exists] that selection tests are more often
valid for whites than for blacks."67 In similar studies, conclusions were also
reached that "psychologists concerned with the applicability of employment
tests to minority groups should direct their future efforts to the study and de-
termination of test fairness rather than to the pseudoproblem of racial differ-
ences in test validity '"6 Thus, under Albermarle and its predecessors, it now
appears that the theory of differential validity has the force of law although it
lacks the support of experts in the field of applied psychology.
IV. Conclusion
In the area of employment testing it is becoming increasingly apparent that
the roles of the EEOC Guidelines and the courts must be redefined. This is
especially so because of the tendency to treat the Guidelines as administrative
regulations and job-relatedness as a legal instead of a factual determination.
The Guidelines issued by the EEOC are quite different from administrative
regulations promulgated by an administrative agency. They are different both
because the EEOC does not have the power to issue substantive regulations and
because the procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, affording
interested parties a chance to express their views, have not been used. The
courts, however, have been treating the Guidelines as administrative regulations
while disguising their action in terms of a vague standard called "great defer-
ence." Instead of such treatment the Guidelines should be viewed more ap-
propriately as those of an advocate and accepted only because of the validity of
their individual reasoning.
It may also be appropriate for the courts to reassess their perspective of
job-relatedness. Job-relatedness is a question of fact that should be decided at
the trial court level. The judicial establishment of unreasonable legal require-
ments, such as requiring that criterion-related validity be established and a
differential validity analysis be performed, on employment testing and the
employers who use them can in the long run only work more of a burden on
minority groups and lessen the likelihood that superior minorities will be recog-
nized. There are more than just three methods of proving job-relatedness and
65 APA Task Force on Employment Testing of Minority Groups, Job Testing and the
Disadvantaged, 24 Am. Psyca. 637, 641 (1969).
66 Humphreys, Statistical Definitions of Test Validity for Minority Groups, 58 J. APPLiED
PsycH. 1 (1973).
67 O'Connor, Wexley & Alexander, Single-Group Validity: Fact or Fallacy?, 60 J.
APPLImD PsYcr. 352, 354 (1975), accord, Gael, Grant & Ritchie, Employment Test Validation
for Minority and Nonminority Clerks with Work Sample Criteria, 60 J. APLIED PsYCH. 420
(1975).
68 Schmidt, Berner & Hunter, supra note 38, at 5.
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any method that carries the burden of proof should be accepted.
In applying the mandates of Title VII, it is not necessary for courts to
destroy an employer's right to use employment tests in order to stop dis-
criminatory practices. Employment tests have a certain objectivity that is neces-
sary if decisions based on merit are to appear fair as well as be fair. The develop-
ment of employment tests is not an exact science; indeed, it has the most difficult
task of trying to predict the future actions of a human being. Employment tests
try to measure a person's aptitude to perform in a certain area, but it must be
realized that aptitude is only one factor in determining how a person will perform
on a job. Above all, it must be remembered that employment tests are important
tools for decision makers in hiring and promoting on the basis of merit and can
benefit both employers and employees.
Roger P. Balog
